Abstract. The stateless characteristic of Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) makes it vulnerable to many ARP cache poisoning attacks like MITM (Man in The Middle) attack, most of which generally aim at the gateway. To solve this problem, there have been solutions like using static ARP entries, or using WinPcap libraries or SNMP to detect and rectify poisoned ARP cache. However, the solutions above need manual operation, which is less feasible when the network is large. In this paper, we propose a respondent solution. After a detection of ARP spoof in the gateway, the trusted server will isolate the attacker and then tell all hosts in the network the real IP-to-MAC mappings of the gateway based on the up-to-date information from its storage, thereby automatically rectifying poisoned ARP cache.
cut off its connection, thereby mitigating the spread of the spoof. These methods have some advantages in automatically detecting and locating compared with the manual one. However, it is half-automatic and still needs manual rehabilitation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the main methodology and gives an example to explain it. Section III presents the results of simulating experiments on a real system. Section IV summarizes our contributions and concludes the paper.
Methodology The Main Idea
To address some issues of these existing methods, this paper introduces a new device "trusted server". Each LAN has such a server and it is used to keep a database, which contains all MAC address to IP address mappings (<IP, MAC>) in a LAN. It is worth noting that we try to make these mappings always up-to-date. Once the ARP spoof is detected in the gateway, the trusted server will help the gateway and all the hosts in this LAN to get the right IP-MAC mappings.
Actually, the trusted server itself does not need to have a MAC address and IP address. We suppose all hosts' IP addresses are given by DHCP server [7] , which is the most common condition. (In the real cases there is a high possibility that there is no DHCP server on a LAN, but at least every LAN contains one DHCP relay agent and they are similar in essence. So we just use "DHCP server" to refer to these two different devices.) Thus, we insert a trusted server in the position where a router is linked to the LAN, as shown in Figure. What a trusted server needs to do to make its information latest is to check and note all packets of DHCPACK, DHCPNACK and DHCPRELEASE. The algorithm is as follows. delete this mapping from database 12 } END So, why this algorithm can make all information in a database up-to-date? First, in the process of getting an IP address from DHCP server, it is only the packets of DHCPACK that determine the final IP address which will be used by the host who wants to apply an IP address.
Second, although all the DHCP servers who receive DHCPDISCOVER will reply DHCPOFFER to a source host, there is only one DHCP server replying DHCPACK to this host. Third, DHCP clients will get a lease period as they get an IP address from DHCP servers, so when they want to discontinue using their current IP addresses or they hope to update their lease periods, packets of DHCPNACK or DHCPRELEASE also need to be considered. [8] Apart from this, a trusted server also needs to do two more things. First, it needs to communicate with the gateway (the router) in the same LAN. Second, a trusted server is also supposed to broadcast ARP reply to all the hosts in this LAN when necessary.
The Automatically Respondent Approach
When ARP spoof is detected in a gateway, the most common condition is that in a cache of a gateway, one MAC address is matched by two or more IP address, the following four steps should be taken.
(1) The gateway sends ARP requests to its trusted server to get the authentic mappings.
(2) This trusted server sends ARP replies to the gateway with authentic <IP, MAC> mappings.
The trusted server broadcasts an ARP reply to tell all the hosts the authentic MAC address of the gateway.
(4) The gateway adds the attacker's MAC address in its own black list and denies receiving its ARP packets (packets will be dropped directly by the gateway if their source IP addresses are on the black list). 
Example
The following example is to explain the approach above.
We suppose that a LAN originally includes two hosts (HostA and HostB) but later an attacker intercepts, and this is shown in the Figure. 3 .
The IP address and MAC address of each device are shown in Table1. 
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Due to ARP spoof, the cache of the router and HostA and HostB are changed to Table2. (4) The gateway adds the MAC address CC-CC-CC-CC-CC-CC in its own black list and denies receiving its ARP packets. Now, the hosts and the router have got the right IP-MAC mappings in their caches, and they can communicate not through the attacker. Besides, all packets from the attacker will not be received by the gateway, so ARP spoof caused by this attacker will not appear again.
Experiment
To verify the effectiveness and correctness of the proposed method, we use C# to simulate it on a PC. Our experiment includes two parts.
Verification of the Latest Information in the Trusted Server
First, we need to confirm that a trusted server can keep the database which contains the latest IP-MAC mappings information by filtering some specific DHCP packets. The result of the program is shown in Figure. 4. 
Verification of the Effectiveness of the Trusted Server
Second, we need to verify that the trusted server can help to solve ARP spoof effectively by taking the four steps mentioned above. The result of the program is shown in Figure 5 . We can find from this figure that the IP-MAC mappings in the cache of the gateway are not correct after ARP spoof. However, by executing our algorithm, these mappings are corrected.
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper analyzes the theory of ARP spoof and compares several existing methods which represent how to address ARP spoof after detected. We also propose a new technique to mitigate it efficiently.
In our method, a trusted server is needed, which is used to keep the up-to-date information of IP-to-MAC mappings coming from a DHCP server. When an ARP spoof is detected, this server can inform the gateway and all the other hosts of the correct IP to MAC mappings, and thus the attacker will be discovered and isolated by the gateway. As a result, without manual intervention, the existing ARP spoof will be solved automatically and safely.
Future work includes using a mechanism of authentication like using digital signature to make trusted servers more robust. As the efficiency of a network may suffer, it is supposed to use it only when necessary to lessen the impact to the efficiency of the network.
